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ABSTRACT

This paper presents certain results, of reaarkable aillplicity,
concerning the aarket allocation of resources to research and development
(R+D) and its coapariaon to socially efficient allocations.
to

■any

In contr••t

previous studies, we posit that a fira can 11Jldertake aore than one

project (at desired levels of intensity) aiaed at the sue innovation, if
it is profitable to do so.

The aarket is characterized by a Bertrand

equilibrbm in the product aarket.

We show that the aarginal private

decisions are independent of the nulber of firaa in the industry; as a
result, the equilibriua R+D (that is, the •uaber of projects mLdertaken in
the aarket, and the level of effort spent on each project) is invariant to
the auaber of firaa.
invariant to the

The equilibriua level of effort per project is also

■agnitucle

of (appropriable) rents fro• successful

illllOTltion.
The aulber of firaa affects the gains fro• innovation to conauaera and
firaa: for any research program, a larger nu.aber of firaa entails larger
gains to conauaera, aaaller 1aina to
benefits.

fir■ a,

and larger aggregate social

While the aarket equilibrium level of effort per project is

shown to coincide with the socially efficient level, the aarket undertakes
fewer projects than is desirable.

THE INVARIANCE OF lt+D TO THE NUJIBER OF FIRMS IN THE INDUSTKY:
EQUILIBJUU)( AND EFFICIENCY UNDER BmrrRAND COIIPETITION
haj Kuaar Sah ud 1oseph E. Stiglitz•

A aajor concern of the recent research in the theory of imtovation has
b.een the effect of aarket structure on private aarginal returns

fro■

innovation, and, thus, on the equilibriua level of aarket R+D.

Recent

work has also eaphaaized the relationship between aariinal private returns
and social returDa which, in general, aay not be the aaae. 1
The present analysis ia baaed on a aodel in which the product aarket
ia characterized by Bertrand equilibria.

We establish four reaarkably

aiaple results.

(i)

The number of finis-in the industry haa no effect on the pace of

innovation.

That is, the marginal decisions of a fir■ to undertake an

additional research project, or to spend additional efforts on a project,
are 11Daffected by the number of firas.

The resulting invariance of the

aarket equilibrium ia in aarked contrast with many previous studies which
have found the nuaber of firas in the industry to be a critical
deterainant of the aarket R+D.

One of the consequences of our result is

that policies aiaed at altering the nuaber of firms in the industry have
no effect on market innovation.
(ii)

The intensity at which

a

research project is pursued in the

market is invariant to the aagnitude of (appropriable) rent from
successful innovation.
undertaken ia larger.

If the rent is larger, then the number of projects
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(iii)

The nllllber of firaa in the industry affects the gains

innovation to firaa
gains.

conauaera and, thus. it affects ag1re1ate social

~

Specifically:

fro ■

A larger nllllber of firas raises con1umer1' cains,

lowers firas' gains, and raises aggregate social gains
Thia result also differs

fro■

fro■

iBlloyation.

that of aoae earlier 1tudie1 which have

1ug1e1ted that a larger number of firaa aay reduce the incentives for
innovation to a dearee that the social welfare is reduced.
(iv)

Regardless of the nuaber of firaa in the industry, fewer

projects are undertaken in the aarket than is socially optimal, though the
intensity at which each project is pursued is optiaal.
An iaportant feature of our aodel is that a

fir■

aay lUlClertake

■ore

than one research project aiaed at the auae ianovation, if it is
profitable to do so.

Thia aasuaption, we believe, ia

an econoaic viewpoint than the one uderlying

■any

■ore

plausible

fro■

previous aodela, in

which a fira can ll!ldertake only one research project.

Alao, it ii easy to

'DJI.Cleratand why this difference in a11uaption has a significant effect on
the analysis of l.+D.

Under our a11uaption, a fina has a larger set of

inatnaents and thus, in general, its behavior is quite different from
that when it is constrained to ll!ldertake a single project.

The resulting

aarket equilibrilllD in research ia also. therefore, different.

Thia

argument holds regardless of the particular aodel one uses (for exaaple,

the particular a11uaption1 one aakea concerning the nature of the product
aarket competition, and the strategic environaent of firaa); though the

specific iaplicationa of our assumption would, of course, depend on the
characteristics of the

■odel.
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THE JIOOm.. AND :RESULTS
A research project has a binary outcoae:
status quo.

If

successful ilUloTation or

ia the T&riable effort (expenditure) on a research

e

project, then the probability of its success is
11p10,

and

p

e

•2

>0

pendent of one aaother.

p(e) ,

The outcoae of different projects is inde-

A firm can 1Uldertake aa aany projects as it

desires, all of which are aiaedat the s ..e iD.Jloyation.
denotes the effort by the
fira undertakes

e 10,

where

i-th

j • 1, •••• k

1

firm on its project

Thus, if. e j
1

j,

and if this

projects, then the probability that at

least one of the projects undertake.a by this firm ii successful ii giyen
by

qi - 1 -

ki
TT (1 - p(eij)) •
j•l

The product aarket is characterized by Bertrand coapetition.
Specifically, the rent gai•ed by a firm la
other fira innovates. 3

R

if it iJmoyates and if no

If two or aore firms iD.Jlovate, then the benefits

of imaoyation accrue solely to con1uaer1.

(The determination of

that of coasuaers' gains, b dhcuued later.)
probability that all firms, other than the

h

1

i-th

R,

ud

denotes the
fira, are unable to

kf
innovate.

That ii,

denotes the firms.

hi •

TT

TI (1 - p(efi)) , where

f = 1, ••• , N

f/:i j•l

N 11,

and it ia finite.

Then, the (expected)

ki

profit of firm

i

2<eij +

ii

a) •

where

a

h

the fixed

j=l
coat of lllldertaking a project.

We focus here on the symmetric interior Nash
firm undertakes the
undertakes

■ore

sa■ e

equilibriu■

in which each

portfolio of projects and, further, if a firm

than one project, then it undertakes identical

4

projects. 4

Therefore

= 1 - (1 - p(e))k • and

(1)

q

(2)

h •

(1 - p(e))

Nk-k

•

opt im. are:

lhq

e

- k • 0 •

ud

k •

and

e

The first order conditions with respect to

Rhqk - (e + a)

s

O •

for a firm's
respectiTely.

These equilibriua conditions can be restated. using (1) and (2) • as

s

n

(4)

-R(l - p) ln(l - p) - (e +a)• 0 •
n • Nk

where

is the total nuaber of projects .adertaken in the aarket.
e •

Note that the aboTe expressions deteraine the investaent.
each project. and the total number.
aarket.

A change in

•nchanged.

N siaply changes

Thus. the only effect of

andertakea. which ia

firs

n •

k = n/N.

in

of projects 1Uldertaken in the
k •

while keeping

n

and

e

N is on the number of projects a
In a duopoly. for instance. each of

two firas undertakes half as aany projects as a

■onopoly

would have

undertaken.
It follows then that the nuaber of firms in the aarket has no iapact
on (a)

the total number of research projects 11J1dertaken; (b) the

intensity of each of the projects; and. therefore (c) the probability of
a successful innovation.

It is also apparent that public policies aimed

at altering the number of firms do not influence the nature of research
activities undertaken in the aarket.
The intuitive idea behind this result is as follows.

Consider the

aarginal decision of a fira to lllldertake the last project (or to invest

the last dollar on a project).

This project (or dollar) yields a benefit

only if the other projects lllldertaken by this firm fail. l l well l l if all
of the projects undertaken by other firms fail.

The aargiaal decisions

are thus influenced by the total nuiber of projects undertaken in the
aarket; and aot by how these projects are distributed between the Ura
aakina the decision and other firaa.

Thus. whether the aarginal project

yields a return, as well as the return froa the aarginal effort invested
in a project are independent of the number of firas.

Furtheraore, it is

easily verified that this iadependence-ho lds in aore general aodels as
well; for instance, when a fira has a vector of control variables.

e •

and when the expected coat of a project is a general function of the
control variables.
A still stronger result is obtained by solving (4) for
substitutin1 the resulting expression into (3).

(5)

and

This yields

-(e + a)p /(1 - p)ln(l - p) - 1 = 0.
e

The above expression characterizes the optiaal
contain

(1 - p)n

R or

N.

e,

and it does not

Thus, the optimal effort per project is independent

not only of the nuaber of firas in the industry, but also of the aagnitude
of rent from successful innovation.
respect to

R •

and noting that

e

Further. by perturbing (3) with
is invariant to this perturbation, we

obtain
(6)

dn/dR = -1/Rln(l - p)

> 0.

Thus. a larger number of projects is undertaken in the

■ arket

if the rent

6

iD.Jlovation is larger.

fro■

The above analysis also brings out clearly the difference between the
consequences of our ass11.11ption that

t

is determined endogenously, and

the standard assumption llJlder which

t

is exogenously fixed at unity.

the latter oaae, it is apparent

In

(3) that the optiaal effort per

fro■

pro_ject (and hence the probability of a successful iD.Jlovation in the
aartet) depends, in general, on the n'llllber of firas.

The neutrality results we have derived aight give

Welfare Analysis:

an iapreaaion that public policy (affecting the n1Ulber of finaa in the
iadustry) has ao role to play in the context of research and iJU1ovation.
This is not correct because, as we shall see, the •--ber of finaa has a
fro ■

significant effect on the gains

innovation to firaa and oon1uaer1.

First. consider the 1aina to con1uaer1.

Suppose the 1uoce11ful

outcoae of a research project leads to a reduction in the (fixed) llJlit
coat fro■

c

0

to

c

• 6 The current (coapetitive) price is

2

c

0

•

If

only one firm innovates then it effectively becoaea a aoaopoly. and sets a
price

where

o •
1

c

0

> o1 > o2

and the oon1uaer1' gain ta

R,

•

The correapondiag rent to the firm ta

s1 co 0 , o1 ) • If two or

■ore

firms
c

innovate then, due to Bertrand competition, the price ta reduced to
and the oon1uaer1' gain ia

s2

s1 > R,

-

fro■

s2 (c 0 ,

c ) •
2

Clearly,

s2 > s1

,

2

and

the standard argUJBenta baaed on consumer surplus.

Thus the (expected) gain to consumers ta

where

f (N\ i

I= 1fr2 1)4 (1 -

q}

are able to innovate, and
able to innovate.

N-i
Nhq

ta the probability that two or

■ore

firms

ta the probability that only one firm ia

g can be expressed aa

,

7

where

(8)

g • z - Nhq,

(9)

z • 1 - (1 - p)n.

Therefore, the gain to oonsUJ1era oan be rewritten as
Now, note froa (9) that

z

does not depend on N.

- (S

2

-

s1 )Nhq.

Further7

< 0.

4(Nhq)/dN • h[kln(l - p) + q]

(10)

s2 z

Thus, the 1ain to oonsuaers is larger if the nuaber of firas is larger.
This is what we would expect, beoauae if the sue number of total projects
h · dhided uong a larger nuaber of firas then the probability of two or

aore firas being able to innovate is higher and, hence, the gain to
oonsuaera is lar1er.
The above argument also suggests that a larger nuaber of firas would
lower the aggregate profit of firaa.

Thia can be aaoertained as follows.

The aggregate oorporate profit is given by

Nn • INhq - Nk(e + a) •

(11)

Now, note that the last terli in the above right hand side does not depend
on

N ,whereas, froa (10), the first term is decreasing in

4(Nn)/4N

< 0.

Further.

4n/4N • [d(Nn)/dN - n]/N

Thus,

if a fira's

Therefore, a larger number of

profit is nonnegative (whioh we assUJ1e).
firas lowers the profit for a single

< 0,

N.

fir■,

as well as for the industry

profit.
Since the number of firms has opposite effects on conausers and firms,
we combine these two effects to study the societal i111plicationa.

Our

analysis here assigns equal weights to the gains of oonsusers and firms
but, as we shall see, some of our results hold for asyametric weights as
well.

The social gain is

B = S + Nn,

which, from (7) and (11), can be

8

oxproaaed aa

Using the sue arau.aenta

aa

s2

before. and recalling that

-

s1 > R

it

•

follows that a larger number of firaa 7iolda a larger social gain from
innovation.

8

An increase in N

Thia result baa a ai11plo interpretation.

incroaaoa tho probability of oonauaora' gain by tho aaao aaount as it
reduces tho probability of firaa being ablo to capture tho ronta, but tho
gains to conauaora exceed tho loaaoa to firms.

Tho laat result also providoa aoao inaighta on public policy.
JOVOl'Dllent can alter the nllllber of firaa in a non-diatortive
the (optiaal) nllllber of

fir■•

An oxaaplo of non-diatortive

a ainglo project.

■ anner.

fir■

should be set auch that oach

If tho
then

UJldertakea

ia an entry

inatru■ ent

aubaidy; provided tho. social woi1ht1 on public revenue ud corporate
profits are the auo.

(Thia conclusion, obviously. does not extend to

diatortivo inatruaonta. such•• invoat■ont tax credita.)
We finally consider tho socially

Social Optim:

allocation to R+D, and contrast it with the
above.
Then

Lot

■arket

9

opti■ al

resource

allocation described

denote the number of projects 'aJldortaken by the planner.

n

Jiven in (9), ia tho probability that at least one project ia

z •

aucceaaful; ia which caao conauaora receive the full benefits of
innovation.

Tho expected social aain ia:

s2 z

- n(e + a) •

corresponding first order conditions, with respect to

e

characterizing the internal optim, can be expressed aa

(13)

(14)

-s2 (1

-

p)

n

ln(l -

p) -

(e +a)= 0.

and

The
n,

9

Note the aiailarity between the social allocation described above. and the
aarket equilibrium described by (3) and (4).
are identical except that the aain
fira. whereas it ia

fro■

The two aeta of expressions

successful innovation ia

R

for a

s2 for the planner. Thia aiailarity should not be

surprising because. once again. the aarginal decision of the planner (to
undertake the last project. or to invest the last dollar on a project)
4opeada on the total nuaber of projects that have already been
udertaken; just the way it did for a fira in the aarket.

Now. recall

s2 > R • de/dR s O and. fro• (6). dn/dR > 0. An i-ediate
consequence of the above ai■Uarity. tllen. is that the aarket undertakes
that

fewer projects than ia socially desirable. but each project ia 11Ddertaken
at the socially efficient level.

CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between the aarket structure and the nature of aarket
R+D. and that between the private and social

■arginal

imaovative activity are. in general. coaplicated.

returns from

Thia paper establishes

two invariance results in the central case of Bertrand coapetition:

the

aarket R+D (that i1 1 the nuaber of research projects undertaken aa well aa
the nature of individual projects) ia invariant to the nUJRber of firaa in
the industry; and the nature of individual projects ia also invariant to
the aagnitude of the rent that a firm gains from 1ucce11ful innovation.
Use of these invariance results has enabled ua to coapare the research
undertaken in the market to socially efficient allocations.
shown. for instance. that the aarket undertakes a

a■ aller

We have

number of

projects than is socially desirable. though each project ia undertaken at

10

the socially efficient level.

Ye have also hinted at soae policy

conclusions; for exurple. the desirability of increasing the nuaber of
firaa (which yields laraer gains to conauaers. saaller gains to firaa. and
larger social welfare gains).

Similar relationships between social and

private returns aay not. however. obtain 1lll4er other foras of coapetition
(for exaaple. Cournot).

Oar analysis thus su1gests the need to coapare

the outcoae1 of p9licie1 aiaed at encouraging price coapetition versus
other foras of ooapetition (for exaaple. quantity ooapetition).

The aeans

by which the government aay affect a choice in the ao4e1 of coapetition
is. however. a question beyond the scope of this short paper.
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FOOTNOTES
•Research support froa the National Science Foundation is 1ratefully
acknowledged.
1.

For instance. in patent races. where the private return ia either
zero. when the fira ia not first to invent. or the total
(appropriable) return when it ia; while the social return ia the
increase in the present value

fro■

having the invention earlier than

it otherwise would have been available.

See Barze! (1968). Dasgupta

aad Stiglitz (1980). ~aaian and Swartz (1982). Loury (1979). and
Stiglitz (forthcoming).
2.

Subscripts

e

aad

denote partial derivatives with respect to

k

these Tariablea.
3.

Here we abstract from iaaues concerning the tiaing and the scale of
ilUlovationa; that ia. by apendia1 aore resourc••• one can alter the
date of innovation or the

4.

■ agnitude

of rent.

There aay not always exist a a:ymaetric interior Nash equilibriua,
because of the non-concavity of the relevant functions.
interior equilibriua. e

>0

•

kl 1 •

and both

e

and

At an
k

are

finite.
5.

For simplicity, we are treating

k

as a continuous variable.

If

k

la treated as an integer, then the expression analogous to (4) is:
R(l - p) n-1 pl (e +
inequality.

a)

l

R(l - p) np,

with at least one strict

This does not affect the invariance result derived below.
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6.

The present analysis can be easily extended to the case where the unit
coat is not fixed.

7.

The sign of the right hand aide of (10) is obtained as follows.
is easily seen to be strictly conoaTe in k.
q(k) - q(k • 0)

< qk(k

kln(l - p) + q(k)
8.

< 0,

• O)k.

q(k)

Thus

Using (1), then,

Thus, (10) is negative.

Thia ooacluaion holds even if the social weight on ooa11111er1' gain is
larger than that on finaa' profits.

9.

It should also be pointed out that certain in1tr1111ent1 of policy aay
aot be feasible due to infonaational proble•••
difficult to

■onitor

For exaaple, it aay be

the nuaber of projects undertaken by a

fir■•
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